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Abstract
Game values often represent data that can be measured in more
than one acceptable way (e.g., monetary amounts). We point out that
in such a case a statement about cooperative n-person game model
might be “meaningless” in the sense that its truth or falsity depends on
the choice of an acceptable way to measure game values. In particular
we analyze statements about solution concepts such as the core, stable
sets, the nucleolus, the Shapley value (and its generalizations).
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1 Introduction
The mathematical theory of cooperative n-person games and related solu-
tion concepts aims to model and analyze problems arising in various disci-
plines from operations research, management science, decision analysis, to
economics, sociology and political science. (For example, cost–allocation,
voting power. For a detailed discussion of applications of n-person games
see [12].) We will consider games in characteristic function form. In other
words, a cooperative n-person game is a function v : 2N → R such that
v(∅) = 0. (N is a finite set of n > 1 elements and 2N denotes the set of
all subsets of N . Throughout we will identify N with [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}.)
Elements of N are called players and a nonempty S ⊆ N is called a coali-
tion. v(S) is a worth (value) of coalition S. Coalition N is also called the
grand coalition, and v(N) is the total value of the game v. Real numbers
v(S), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , are called game values (or values of the game v).
Note that v(∅) = 0 is not considered a game value (since it is defined to be
zero for every game). A solution to a cooperative game v should present a
“fair allocation” of the total value of the game, v(N), among the players. A
vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) such that
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N) (the condition known as
Pareto-optimality) is a solution for the game v. There are various solution
concepts proposing a “fair” solution(s) to the game.
In many applications, game values represent data measured on some scale
of measurement (for example, the amount of money can be expressed in dol-
lars, German marks, or any other monetary unit). In this paper we will
analyze how the choice of an acceptable way to measure game values effects
the conclusions that can be drawn from the cooperative n-person game mod-
els. In particular, we consider statements about several widely used solution
concepts such as the core, stable sets, the nucleolus, the Shapley value (and
some of its generalizations), and analyze whether the truth or falsity (i.e.,
the truth value) of these statements is independent of the (acceptable) choice
of the scale of measurement of the game values.
Let us give a simple example to illustrate the type of questions that will
be discussed in this paper:
Example 1 Suppose that two companies X and Y consider a merger. It is
estimated that company X is worth $1 million and company Y is worth $2
million. Analysts estimate the value of the possible corporation XY resulting
from merging X and Y as $5 million. Owners of both companies need to
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decide on their share in the possible corporation XY . Obviously, the owners
of X would not agree to any deal giving them less than one fifth of the
ownership of XY (because their company X alone is worth $1 million, which
is one fifth of the estimated value of XY ). Similarly, the owners of Y would
not agree to any deal giving them less than two fifths of the ownership of XY .
Hence, any agreement giving P% ownership of XY to the owners of X might
be viewed acceptable as long as 20 ≤ P ≤ 60. (Note that this conclusion
is independent of the choice of the monetary unit representing values of X,
Y and XY .) Suppose that, by the merger agreement, the owners of X were
given 30% of the ownership of XY .
What if the government is about to deregulate the industry and any
company doing business (X, Y , or XY ) would not need to pay flat licence
fee K anymore? For example, suppose that the licence fee was K = $1
million. Then the value of X, Y , and XY are 2, 3, and 6 million dollars,
respectively. In such a case, any agreement giving P% ownership of XY
to the owners of X might be viewed acceptable as long as 33.3̇ ≤ P ≤ 50.
Suddenly, the deal giving only 30% of the ownership of XY to the owners of
X becomes totally unacceptable. Hence, if the new licence fee is not known
in advance, any agreement on the number P might be ill fated.
The situation like this might be represented as a cooperative n-person
game (in this case n = 2) defined by v : {{X}, {Y }, {X, Y }} → R (where
the game value v(S) denotes the estimated value of the company merging
all companies from the set S). As this example demonstrates, one might
question whether any solution concept might be used if the game values
depend on K as described.
In Section 2 we briefly introduce the language of the measurement theory,
introduce “ratio”, “interval” and “ordinal” scales, and define the concept
of “meaningfulness” which will play the central role throughout the paper.
Informally, a statement about the game v is meaningful if its truth value
does not depend on the choice of an acceptable way to measure game values
v(S), S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. In Section 3 we first recall definitions of the solution
concepts that will be considered and define some additional terminology. We
also show that, whenever the game values are measured on a “ratio scale”,
the conclusions about solution concepts are meaningful. As demonstrated in
Section 4, when game values are measured on “interval scales”, “positive”
statements about solution concepts are almost exclusively meaningless. In
other words, in the case of interval scales, a statement that an allocation
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of v(N) among the players is “fair” (according to a solution concept that
is considered) is meaningful only if the statement is false. In Section 5 we
demonstrate that there is no hope for a solution concept which would yield
“positive” statements in the case where game values are measured on an
“ordinal scale”. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the results presented. For
example, we argue that the Shapley value (and its generalizations), in some
sense, is a more robust solution concept than the core, stable sets, or the
nucleolus. As an attempt to simplify the exposition and spare the casual
reader of technical details, all the proofs are excluded from the main body
of the paper and can be found in the Appendix.
2 Scales of Measurement, Admissible Trans-
formations, Meaningfulness
In this section we briefly (and informally) introduce the language of mea-
surement theory. There exists an extensive literature on this subject (for
example , [3, 14, 4, 5, 6]), and we will follow [8]. A scale of measurement is a
mapping which assigns real numbers to objects being measured in such a way
that certain empirical relations are preserved. An admissible transforma-
tion of scale is a transformation Φ of scale values which leads to another
acceptable mapping, i.e., one which again preserves the empirical relations.
For example, all exchange rates are of the form Φ(x) = αx, α > 0. Similarly,
we can measure mass in pounds or kilograms and here we have Φ(x) = 2.2x
where x is the amount in kg. and Φ(x) is the amount in lb. The set of
all admissible transformations of a particular scale of measurement defines a
scale type. In this paper we will consider the scales types that often arise
in practice:
• Ratio Scales. If the set of all admissible transformations of the scale of
measurement is {Φ(x) = αx : α > 0} we are talking about a ratio scale
(“objects are measured on a ratio scale”). In the case of ratio scales every-
thing is defined up to the choice of the unit of measurement. Measurement
of mass, currency amounts, time (seconds, minutes, hours) are examples of
ratio scales. In many applications, game values v(S) represent the amount
of money (or some other measure of cardinal utility) that coalition S can get
(or would need to pay). In such a case, game values represent data measured
on a ratio scale and one can express game values in terms of any monetary
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unit. For example, if the game values v(S) represent the amount of money
in dollars, then the values Φ(v(S)), where Φ(t) = 1.5t, represent the amount
of money in German marks (provided that the exchange rate is 1.5 German
marks for one dollar). Hence, instead of analyzing game v, one might want
to analyze game Φ(v) whose game values are Φ(v(S)), S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅.
• Interval Scales. An interval scale is a scale where the set of the admis-
sible transformations is {Φ(x) = αx+ β : α > 0, β ∈ R} (there is a choice of
the unit and the zero point of measurement). For example, temperature is
measured on an interval scale: Φ(x) = 95x + 32 is a transformation from
oF
to oC. If the game values represent monetary amounts, and if these values
also depend on an unknown flat fee (which is the same for all game values;
e.g., government licence fee, fixed start-up costs), then this is the same as
to say that the game values are measured on an interval scale. (Note that
Φ(t) = α(t +K) = αt + αK is an admissible transformation of game values
for any α > 0 and any K. K represents the flat fee, and α is the exchange
rate).
• Ordinal Scales. In many instances very precise data is not available and
the most that is given is a relationship among data. For example, we can
only have ordering or a preference list of all the game values. (In other words,
for any two coalitions S and T we can only say whether the worth of the
coalition S is greater or equal than the worth of T , i.e., whether v(S) ≥ v(T )
does or does not hold.) In such a case any increasing function Φ is an admis-
sible transformation. If only the relative ordering among the data is known,
then {Φ : Φ is increasing} is the set of the admissible transformations and
we say that data is measured on an ordinal scale.
In many situations, the problem data must be nonnegative (positive)
numbers. For example, if the game values v(S) represent the time that is
needed to serve all players from S (note that v(S) might not be known pre-
cisely but, say, just as an ordinal scale data, e.g. it might only be known that
more time is needed to serve players from T than to serve players from S), and
in such a case v(S) must be positive (nonnegative) numbers. Whenever data
is restricted to positive (nonnegative) numbers, we have related scale types:
positive (nonnegative) ratio scale (the set of the admissible transforma-
tions is {Φ(x) = αx : α > 0}), positive (nonnegative) interval scale (the
set of the admissible transformations for a game v whose values are measured
on a positive (nonnegative) interval scale is {f(x) = αx+β : α > 0, αv(S)+β
is positive(nonnegative) for every coalition S}), and positive (nonnega-
tive) ordinal scale (the set of the admissible transformations is the set of
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all increasing functions on the set of all positive (nonnegative) real numbers.
The central measurement theory concept that will be used in this paper is
that of meaningfulness. We say that a statement involving scales of measure-
ment is meaningful if its truth value is unchanged after applying admissible
transformations to all scales in the statement. Therefore, meaningful state-
ments are unambiguous in their interpretation and they say something about
fundamental relations among the objects being measured. Statements which
are not meaningful are meaningless. Obviously, we cannot put much weight
behind such statements since their truth value is an accident of the choice of
an (acceptable) way to measure the objects in question.
It should be noted that the importance of the meaningfulness of the con-
clusions that can be drawn from mathematical models for various problems
of operations research was first pointed out by Roberts [9]
In the rest of this section, we define meaningfulness of the statements
about games. We first introduce additional notation:
For a game v : 2[n] → R and a function Φ : R → R, a game Φ(v),
Φ(v) = Φ ◦ v : 2[n] → R, is defined in a natural way:
Φ(v)(S) := Φ(v(S)), ∅ 6= S ⊆ [n].
Note that Φ(v)(∅) = 0 by the definition of the game. Also note that Φ only
needs to be defined on the image of v, v(2N \ {∅}) and that the range of Φ
might only be the positive (nonnegative) numbers.
For α ∈ R, the game αv is defined by (αv)(S) := αv(S) (i.e., αv = Φ(v)
where Φ(t) = αt).
We will say that v is a ratio scale game (interval scale game, ordinal
scale game, positive (nonnegative) interval scale game, . . . ) if v is a game
whose game values represent data measured on a ratio scale (interval scale,
ordinal scale, positive(nonnegative) interval scale, . . . ).
Let P[v] be a statement about the game v where the game values represent
data measured on some scale of measurement S. Let AT (S) denote the set
of all admissible transformations of the scale of measurement S.
We say that P[v] is a meaningful statement about the game v if
∀Φ ∈ AT (S) : P[v]⇔ P[Φ(v)].
If P[v] is not meaningful, we say that P[v] is meaningless. In other words,
P[v] is a meaningless statement about the game v if
∃Φ ∈ AT (S) : P[v] 6⇔ P[Φ(v)].
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Remark 2 Let the game values of v represent data measured on a scale
S and let Φ ∈ AT (S). Then P[v] is meaningful if and only if P[Φ(v)] is
meaningful. This follows directly from the definition of meaningfulness.
Example 3 We say that a game v is superadditive if
∀S, T ⊆ [n], S 6= ∅ 6= T, S ∩ T = ∅ : v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ). (1)
In some sense, superadditivity indicates that any group of players would be
at least as well off (as a group) if they form one big coalition, than if they par-
tition themselves in several coalitions. Most of the games, as mathematical
models for practical problems, are superadditive. Some authors even require
(1) to hold as a part of the definition of a game (for example, Roberts [7]).
If v is a ratio scale game, then the statement P[v]= “v is superadditive”
is meaningful. Obviously,
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T )⇔ αv(S) + αv(T ) ≤ αv(S ∪ T )
for any α > 0.
If v is an interval scale game then the statement P[v] is meaningless. For
any pair of disjoint nonempty S, T ⊆ [n] and any Φβ(t) = t+ β (which is an
admissible transformation with α = 1) we get
Φβ(v)(S) + Φβ(v)(T ) ≤ Φβ(v)(S ∪ T )⇔ β ≤ v(S ∪ T )− v(S)− v(T )
Hence, if we choose β1 and β2 such that
β1 ≤ min{v(S ∪ T )− v(S)− v(T ) : S, T ⊆ [n], S 6= ∅ 6= T, S ∩ T = ∅} < β2,
then the game Φβ1(v) is superadditive while the game Φβ2(v) is not. Hence,
the conclusion that v is a superadditive game is meaningless since either
P[v] 6⇔ P[Φβ1(v)] or P[v] 6⇔ P[Φβ2(v)].
3 Meaningful Solution Concepts: The Case
of Ratio Scales
In this section we first introduce the solution concepts that will be considered
and then analyze the meaningfulness of the statements about these solution
concepts for ratio scale games.
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We define x(∅) := 0. In this notation, x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a solution if
x(N) = v(N).
We will also use vmax and vmin to denote the maximum and minimum
among all game values:
vmax := max
S 6=∅
v(S) and vmin := min
S 6=∅
v(S).
It is reasonable to assume that any solution x for the game v should
guarantee that player i will get at least as much as v({i}). (Otherwise, this
player would be better off if (s)he leaves the grand coalition). This principle
is called individual rationality, i.e., x ∈ Rn satisfies individual rationality
for the game v if xi ≥ v({i}), for all i = 1, . . . , n. Solutions (i.e., Pareto-
optimal vectors) that are also individually rational (xi ≥ v({i})) are called
imputations. We will denote the set of all imputations of the game v by
M , i.e.,
M = M(v) = {x ∈ Rn : x(N) = v(N), xi ≥ v({i}), i = 1, . . . , n}
Consider two solutions x,y. We say that x dominates y (and write
x  y) if there exists a nonempty S such that
xi > yi for all i ∈ S and x(S) ≤ v(S) (2)
Therefore, if x  y then y is unlikely to be considered as a “fair” allocation of
v(N) since players from S would be better off by forming their own coalition
S and distributing v(S) according to x.
The core of the game v (introduced by Shapley [11] and independently
by Gillies [2]) is the set
C = C(v) := {x : x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S), S ⊆ N}.
The core is the set of all possible solutions where no coalition has an incentive
to secede from the grand coalition. Note that C = ∅ indicates that there is
no solution such that everyone in the grand coalition is satisfied, i.e., for any
solution x, there is a coalition S which is dissatisfied with x.
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The first solution concept for n-person games was the concept of the
stable set introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [15]. The set V ⊂
M is an externally stable set for game v if for every solution y 6∈ V there
exists x ∈ V such that x  y. The set V is stable if it is a minimal externally
stable set, i.e., if it is externally stable and no W ⊂ V is externally stable.
Note that any stable set V partitions M in a natural way: M = V ∪ (M \V )
where M \ V is exactly the set of all vectors dominated by some element of
V :
M \ V = {y ∈M : ∃x ∈ V s.t. x  y}.
Clearly, if there exists a stable set V , then C ⊆ V ⊂ M . In some sense, a
stable set is a relaxation of the core since it just gives a set of distributions x
that have a chance to be acceptable to all players in the sense that if y 6∈ V
then ∃x ∈ V such that x  y.
In many cases it is important to have a single solution for the game. In
this sense, the core and a stable set of the game might not be satisfactory
solutions. In what follows we recall definitions of some widely used single
point solution concepts.
For a solution x we define the excess of the coalition S with respect
to x:
ev(S,x) = e(S,x) := v(S)− x(S).
(Note that e(∅,x) = 0). e(S,x) is a measure of the dissatisfaction of coalition
S with distribution x. The larger e(S,x) is, the more dissatisfied players from
S are with distribution x (the more they can get by seceding). A “demo-
cratic” solution for a game would be to minimize the maximal dissatisfaction
of any of the coalitions. This idea was introduced by Schmeidler [10] More
precisely, for a given solution x, we consider a 2n-dimensional vector e(x)
where the coordinates of e(x) are the numbers e(S,x), S ⊆ N , arranged in
nonincreasing order. The nucleolus of the game is a solution x such that
e(x) is lexicographically smaller than e(y) for any other solution y. In other
words, for i := min{j : e(x)j 6= e(y)j} we have e(x)i < e(y)i. It is not
so obvious that the nucleolus always exists and that it is unique [10](1994).
The nucleolus minimizes maximal dissatisfaction and, in contrast to stable
set and core, is not a set but a single distribution, and it always exists.
Maybe the most important solution concept for n-person games is the
Shapley value (introduced by Shapley [11]). For every player i we define
si = si(v) :=
∑
S⊆N−{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]. (3)
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The vector s = s(v) := (s1, . . . , sn) is the Shapley value of the game v.
Shapley’s idea leads to the whole new class of value solutions for n-person
games: Suppose that we are given constants c(S, i) for all i ∈ N and all
S ⊆ N −{i}. Then we can define the c-value of the game v to be the vector




c(S, i)[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]. (4)
(For example, by taking C(S, i) = 1 for all i and all S, we obtain the Banzhaf
value [1]) There is no reason to assume that the vector [c(v)](N) is a solu-
tion, i.e., that [c(v)](N) = v(N) (in fact, the Shapley value is the only
c-value which is a solution for any game v [11]). However, multiplying c by
v(N)/[c(v)](N) (provided [c(v)](N) 6= 0), we obtain a solution. We call such
solution the c-index. Any c-index is a measure of power of players in the
game and gives consequent distribution of v(N) If, in addition, c(S, i) = c(S)
(independent of i) we say that the c-value (and the c-index) is symmetric.
We will analyze the meaningfulness of the solution concepts introduced
in this section. As already mentioned, the game values, v(S), may represent
data measured on a certain scale of measurement. In such a case, it makes
sense to investigate how much of the total value of the game one player should
get compared to how much of that value another player should get, but it
makes no sense to hope for a fixed solution x as the following Proposition
shows:
Proposition 4 For any interval (ordinal) scale game v and any vector x,
the statement P[v]=”x is a solution for v” is meaningless. Similarly, for
any ratio scale game and any vector x such that v(N)x(N) > 0, P[v] is a
meaningless statement.
Instead of solutions x (x(N) = v(N)), it is natural to consider normal-
ized solutions y = (1/v(N))x (y is the normalization of x). Note that
y also describes the allocation (prescribed by x) of the total value of the
game, v(N), among the players. Also note that y(N) = 1 (provided that
x(N) = v(N) 6= 0), so determining whether y is a normalized solution does
not depend on the scale of measurement of the game values.
The following notation will be handy: for a set D ⊆ Rn and λ ∈ R we
define
αD := {αx : x ∈ D}.
10
If there exists α > 0 such that ∀x ∈ D, x(N) = α−1, then ∀αx ∈ αD,
(αx)(N) = 1, and we say that αD is the normalization of D. L The fol-
lowing theorem shows that there is a natural correspondence between solution
concepts for the game v and αv.
Theorem 5 For any game v,
1. x ∈ C(v) if and only if αx ∈ C(αv). In other words, C(αv) = αC(v).
2. V is a stable set for v if and only if αV is a stable set for αv.
3. x is the nucleolus of v if and only if αx is the nucleolus of αv.
4. Let c(S, i), i = 1, . . . , n, and S ⊆ N − {i}, be given. Then x is the
c-index of v if and only if αx is the c-index of αv
A direct consequence of this result is that, in the case of ratio scale
games, it is meaningful to assert that a vector x is (in) the normalization of
any of the solution concepts that we have introduced. In other words, the
conclusions about the existence of the normalization of the core, a stable set,
the nucleolus, or a c-index are meaningful for ratio scale games.
Corollary 6 Let D ⊆ {x ∈ Rn : x(N) = 1}. Suppose P[v] is the statement
“D is the normalization of the core (a stable set, the nucleolus, the c-index)
for game v.” Then P[v] is a meaningful statement for any ratio scale game
v.
4 Meaningless Solution Concepts: The Case
of Interval Scales
In this section we discuss the meaningfulness of the statement P[v] from
Corollary 6 for interval scale games. The analysis in the case of ratio scale
games was straightforward (and almost trivial). Unfortunately, things get
much more complicated in the case of interval scale games. Furthermore, the
results are negative:
Example 1 (revisited): Let v : 2[2] → R be a game whose game values are
v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = 3, and v({1, 2}) = 6. Then the core of v is the set
C(v) = {(x1, x2) : x1 ≥ 2, x2 ≥ 3, x1 + x2 = 6}, and the normalization of
C(v) is the set D(v) = {(x1, x2) : x1 + x2 = 1, .3̇ ≤ x1 ≤ .5}.
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If v is an interval scale game, then, for every Φ(t) = αt + β, α > 0,
the game values of Φ(v) are an acceptable way of representing the game
values of v. (In the situation presented in Example 1, α might be viewed
as the exchange rate, and β might represent a government licence fee or a
government premium, say in the form of a flat tax break.)
Consider the game Φ0(v) where Φ0(t) = t − 1. Then, [Φ0(v)]({1}) = 1,
[Φ0(v)]({2}) = 2, and [Φ0(v)]({1, 2}) = 5. Thus, C(Φ0(v)) = {(x1, x2) :
x1 ≥ 1, x2 ≥ 2, x1 + x2 = 5} and the normalization of C(Φ0(v)) is the set
D(Φ0(v)) = {(x1, x2) : x1 + x2 = 1, .2 ≤ x1 ≤ .6}.
Note that D(v) 6= D(Φ0(v)). For example, (.3, .7) ∈ D(Φ0(v))\D(v). (In
fact, it is straightforward to show that D(v) 6= D(Φ(v)) for any increasing
affine transformation Φ 6= id. Furthermore, D(Φ(v)) = ∅, for any Φ(t) =
αt + β where β > α > 0.)
Hence, the statement P[v]=“x is in the normalization of C(v)” might be
meaningless.
We first note that without loss of generality we may always assume that
v(N) = 1.
Remark 7 Let v be an interval scale game (positive interval scale game,
nonnegative interval scale game). Note that there exists an admissible trans-
formation Φ such that Φ(v(N)) = 1 (take Φ(t) = 1
v(N)t if v(N) > 0, and take
Φ(t) = t + 1 − v(N) if v(N) ≤ 0). and let P[v] be some statement about
games. v. By Remark 2, P[v] is a meaningful statement if and only if P[Φ(v)]
is a meaningful statement. In other words, in analysis of meaningfulness of
P[v], we may always assume that v(N) = 1.
It is rather surprising that, for any interval scale game v, and for any
normalized solution x that allocates “positive” share of the total value of
the game to every player (i.e., any x such that x1 > 0, x2 > 0, . . . , xn > 0
or in short notation: x ≥ 0), not only that there is an acceptable way to
measure game values so that x is not in the normalization of the core, but
there is also another acceptable way to measure game values so that x is in
the normalization of the core. In other words,
Theorem 8 For any interval scale game v and any x > 0 such that x(N) =
1, the statement P[v]= “x is in the normalization of C(v)” is meaningless.
This result has several important consequences:
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Corollary 9 For any D⊆ {x ∈ Rn : x(N)= 1} and any interval scale game
v, the statement P[v]= “D is the normalization of the core (a stable set) of
v” is meaningless.
Corollary 10 For any interval scale game v and any vector x > 0 such
that x(N) = 1, the statement P[v]= “x is in the normalization of M(v)” is
meaningless.
Corollary 11 Let x be a vector, let v be an interval scale game, and let P[v]
be the statement “x is in the normalization of C(v)”. If P[v] is meaningful,
then it is false.
Corollary 11 shows that, in the case of interval scale games, no normalized
solution x (regardless whether x > 0 or not) can be in the normalization of
C(Φ(v)) for every admissible transformation Φ. Hence, if only normalized
solutions that are in the normalization of C(v) are considered “fair”, then no
interval scale game has a “fair” normalized solution (i.e., such statement is
either false or meaningless). However, there can be solutions for which it is
meaningful to say that they are “unfair” (i.e., a normalized solution which
is not in C(Φ(v)) for any choice of an admissible transformation Φ).
Example 12 As demonstrated by Corollary 11, the statement P[v]= “x is
in the normalization of C(v)” is meaningful only if it is false.
For example, consider an interval scale two player game v, defined by
v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = 0, and v({1, 2}) = 1. Then x = (1, 0) cannot be
in the normalization of C(Φ(v)) for any Φ(t) = αt + β, α > 0. This is
because ([Φ(v)]({1, 2}))x = (α + β, 0) and [Φ(v)]({1}) = 2α + β. Hence
([Φ(v)]({1, 2}))x1 = α + β < 2α + β = [Φ(v)]({1}). Hence, P[Φ(v)] is false
for any choice of an admissible transformation Φ.
Corollary 11 holds even in a more restrictive case when we require that
all game values are positive, i.e., in the case of positive interval scale games.
(In fact, the same is true for non-negative interval scales also.)
Theorem 13 Let v be a positive interval scale game and let P[v] be the
statement “x is in the normalization of C(v)”. If P[v] is meaningful then it
is false.
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Corollary 14 Let v be a positive interval scale game and let P[v] be the
statement “x is in the normalization of some stable set of v”. If P[v] is
meaningful then it is false.
Now we turn our attention to single point solution concepts. In what
follows, we will show that statements similar to statements of Corollary 11,
Theorem 13, and Corollary 14 hold for the single point solution concepts that
were introduced in Section 3. More precisely, for almost every interval scale
game v, the statement that x is the normalization of a single point solution
of v is meaningful only if it is always false (i.e., false for every game Φ(v)
where f(t) = αt + β, α > 0). However, we first present a class of interval
scale games for which this statement is always true.
We say that the game v is symmetric if for any permutation π of [n],
and any S ⊆ N , v(π(S)) = v(S). This is clearly equivalent to saying that
for every S ⊆ N , v(S) = f(|S|) for some function f .
Proposition 15 Let v be a symmetric game. Then the normalization of the
nucleolus and any symmetric c-value is x = 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1).
Corollary 16 If v is a symmetric interval scale game then the statement
P[v]= “x is the normalization of the nucleolus (a symmetric c-value)” is
meaningful.
For any interval scale game, the equidistribution of the total value of the
game (i.e., a solution whose normalization is 1
n
(1, . . . , 1)) is the only solution
that has a chance to be the normalization of the nucleolus for any choice of
an acceptable way to measure game values. In order to prove this, we need
the following Lemma.
Lemma 17 Let v be a game such that v(N) = 1. Suppose that there exists
a y such that for arbitrary large β, y is the normalization of the nucleolus of




(1, 1, . . . , 1).
Theorem 18 Let y 6= 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1) be the normalization of the nucleolus
of an (positive) interval scale game v Let P[v] be the statement “y is the
normalization of the nucleolus”. If P[v] is meaningful then it is false.
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Finally, we show that similar results hold for c-values. We first give an
example:
Example 1 (revisited again): Let v and Φ0(v) be as before, that is, let
v : 2[2] → R be a game whose game values are v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = 3, and
v({1, 2}) = 6, and let Φ0(t) = t− 1 (i.e., [Φ0(v)]({1}) = 1, [Φ0(v)]({2}) = 2,
and [Φ0(v)]({1, 2}) = 5).
The Shapley value of v is s(v) = 6( 512 ,
7
12), and the Shapley value of Φ0(v)
















for the interval scale game v and any y, the statement P[v]= “ 1
v(N)s(v) = y”
cannot be a meaningful true statement (because y 6= (25 ,
3





Theorem 19 Let y 6= 0, and let c(v) 6= 0 be the symmetric c-value of an
(positive) interval scale game v Suppose that [c(v)](N) 6= 0 and suppose that
the statement P[v]= “ 1[c(v)](N)c(v) = y” is true. Then P[v] is meaningful if
and only if one of the following holds:
1. y is the normalization of (c(∅, 1), c(∅, 2), . . . , c(∅, n)). or
2. (c(∅, 1), c(∅, 2), . . . , c(∅, n)) = 0
For example, both the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value are symmetric
c values with c(∅) = 1/n in the former and c(∅) = 1 in the latter case.
Therefore, condition 2. of Theorem 19 is not satisfied and in these cases a
true statement P[v] (from Theorem 19) is meaningful if and only if y = 0 or
y = 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1).
5 An Impossibility Result: The Case of Or-
dinal Scales
It should be noted that all results from Section 4 extend to ordinal scale
games. This is because every admissible transformation for interval scale
games, Φ(t) = αt+β, α > 0, is also an admissible transformation for ordinal
scale games (since Φ is increasing). Also, the proof of the only “positive”
result, Corollary 16, only requires that Φ is injective (so, Corollary 16 holds
for ordinal scale games also). In other words, replacing “interval scale” with
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“ordinal scale” throughout Section 4 yields results about meaningless state-
ments about ordinal scale games.
In order to show that, essentially, there is no solution concept which would
yield meaningful conclusions for every ordinal scale game, we need a slightly
different point of view on ordinal (ratio, interval) scale games.
Let u, v be two ordinal scale n-person games. We say that u ∼ v if there
exists an admissible transformation Φ (i.e., increasing function) such that
u = Φ(v). Note that ∼ is an equivalence relation on the set of all n-person
games. The number of different equivalence classes is the number of different
ordinal scale games (in the sense that they do not present the same game
whose game values are measured in different but acceptable ways). This
can be generalized for ratio and interval scale games: if u, v are two ratio
(interval) scale games, then we say that u ∼ v if there exists an admissible
transformation Φ such that u = Φ(v). Relation ∼ is an equivalence relation
and the number of different equivalence classes is the number of different
ratio (interval) scale games. (In fact, any group G of real valued functions
defines an equivalence relation ∼: u ∼ v ⇔ ∃f ∈ G :u = Φ(v)). Hence, ratio
(interval, ordinal) scale games can be viewed as equivalence classes defined
by the equivalence relation ∼ on the set of all n-person games (u ∼ v ⇔
u = Φ(v) for some admissible transformation Φ of game values of v).
Proposition 20 Let n > 1. There are
(r) uncountably many ratio scale n-person games.
(i) uncountably many interval scale n-person games.
(o) finitely many ordinal scale n-person games. More precisely, the number
of ordinal scale n-person games is the number of preferential assignments of
2n − 1 objects.
Remark 21 There are 13 ordinal scale two-player games, 47293 ordinal
scale three-player games, 230283190977853 ordinal scale four-player games
. . . (that is, the number of preferential assignments of 3, 7, 15,. . . objects).
More about the number of preferential assignments can be found in [13].
Note that there is a natural 1-1 correspondence between n-person games
and R2n−1: we just list all game values in the vector form
v = (v({1}), v({2}), v({1, 2}), v({3}), v({1, 3}), . . . , v({2, . . . , n}), v([n]))
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In this notation, any singe point solution concept is just a function f :
R2
n−1 → Rn such that [f(v)](N) = v(N). Similarly, a normalized solu-
tion concept is a function f : R2n−1 → {x ∈ Rn : x(N) = 1}. The other
solution concepts can also be viewed as functions. For example, the normal-
ization of the core can be represented as a function f : R2n−1 → {D ⊂ Rn :
x ∈ D → x(N) = 1}. The truth value of any statement P[v] about the
games can also be represented as a function fP[v] : R2
n−1 → {True,False}.
In this setup, P[v] is meaningful for a ratio (interval, ordinal) scale game v
if and only if fP[v] is a constant function on the v’s equivalence class (under
∼).
We will call a function f defined on the set of all n-person games, R2n−1
non-degenerate if it attains infinitely many values, i.e., if the set f(R2n−1)
is not finite. For example, (the normalization of) the core, a stable set, the
nucleolus, the c-value, are all examples of non-degenerate functions. In the
case of single point solution concepts (i.e., functions f : R2n−1 → Rn) it is
reasonable to expect that f is not a constant function and that f is continuous
(small changes in game values result in small changes in the proposed solution
for distribution of the total value of the game). Note that any such function
is non-degenerate.
Unfortunately, there is no hope for a non-degenerate solution concept that
would yield to meaningful conclusions in the case of ordinal scale games.
Theorem 22 Let f : R2n−1 → T be a non-degenerate function defined on
the set of all n-person games. Then there exists an ordinal scale game v such
that, for any x ∈ T , the statement P[v] = “x = f(v)” is meaningful only if
it is false.
A direct consequence of Theorem 22 is an impossibility result:
Corollary 23 There is no f : R2n−1 → T such that both of the following
hold:
(a) f is non-degenerate.
(b) For every ordinal scale game v, there exists x ∈ T such that the statement
P[v] = “x = f(v)” is a meaningful true statement.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered the meaningfulness of various statements
about the most common solution concepts for n-person games. We showed
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that these statements are meaningful in the case of ratio scale games (Sec-
tion 3) but, except in some special cases, they are meaningless in the case
of interval scale games (Section 4). In the case of ordinal scales, we have
demonstrated that there is no hope that any “reasonable” solution concept
would yield to meaningful true statements(Section 5).
From the point of view of measurement of game values, there is no rea-
son to prefer any of the solution concepts to another. Our analysis can also
be viewed as an attempt to compare the “robustness” of various solution
concepts (in a sense of invariance under perturbations of data). We have
analyzed robustness of several standard solution concepts under linear and
affine scaling of game values (i.e., under admissible transformations for ratio
and interval scales). However, more general approach (not necessarily along
the lines of our presentation) is needed in order to understand how various
solution concepts compare to each other and whether any of the solution
concepts are more robust than others. A first step toward such analysis
would be to define the concept of an “invariant transformation” for a so-
lution concept (i.e., a transformation of game values which does not affect
certain conclusions that might be drawn using a particular solution concept).
Then, one would be able to compare different solution concepts by comparing
corresponding sets of invariant transformations.
Although we have shown that, in the case of interval scale games (i.e.,
under affine scaling of game values), all solution concepts that were con-
sidered yield meaningless conclusions, c-values should be considered more
robust than the other solution concepts. Namely, if we redefine a game to
be any function v : 2N → R (i.e., if v(∅) can also be any real number and
be considered a game value), then all the results concerning the core, stable
sets, and the nucleolus still hold (because ∅ didn’t play any role in the ra-
tio scale considerations and it doesn’t change anything in the interval scale
considerations of the core, a stable set, and the nucleolus). However, the
statement P[v]= “x is the normalization of a symmetric c-value” would be
meaningful for any interval scale game v and any c-value. This is obvious
from (4) since αv(S) + β − (αv(T ) + β) = α(v(S)− v(T )). In other words,
normalized c-values are invariant under affine scaling of game values (pro-
vided that v(∅) is also considered a game value), while the normalizations
of the core, stable sets, or nucleolus are not. Hence, in some sense, c-values
(such as the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value) are more robust solution
concepts.
Finally, the reader should note that the aim of this paper is not to present
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an exhaustive analysis of the meaningfulness of all solution concepts for coop-
erative n-person games (we have not considered several well-known concepts
such as the kernel and the bargaining set, neither we have discussed solution
concepts for non-cooperative games such as Nash equilibria). Our goal is
to point out that information about scales of measurement of game values
(as well as any other type of invariance) is important and should not be
overlooked not only in sensitivity analysis of various solution concepts, but
whenever cooperative n-person games are used as a mathematical model for
a practical problem.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.
We need to find two admissible transformations, Φ1,Φ2 such that P[Φ1(v)]
is true and P[Φ2(v)] is false (i.e., [Φ1(v)](N) = x(N) 6= [Φ2(v)](N)). For Φ1,
take Φ1(t) = t−v(N)+x(N) (Φ1(t) = x(N)v(N) t in the case of ratio scale games).
For Φ2, take Φ2(t) = t− v(N) +x(N) + 1 (Φ2(t) = 2x(N)v(N)t in the case of ratio
scale games).
Proof of Theorem 5.
Straightforward from definitions of various solution concepts. First note that
x is a solution for v if and only if αx is a solution for αv, α > 0. Also note
that we only need to prove the sufficiency in each of the four statements.
This is because, for any α > 0, the necessity direction is just the sufficiency
direction for the game αv with α−1.
1. (core) We just need to check that for every S:
x(S) ≥ v(S)⇒ αx(S) ≥ (αv)(S).
This is obvious since (αv)(S) = αv(S) for every S.
2. (stable set) Let y 6∈ αV be a solution for the game αv. Then, there
exists x ∈ V and S ⊆ N such that x  α−1y (note that α−1y is a
solution for v). In other words,
x(S) ≤ v(S) and xi > α−1yi, ∀i ∈ S.
Hence, it follows immediately that
αx(S) ≤ (αv)(S) and αxi > yi, ∀i ∈ S,
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i.e., αx  y in the game αv. Therefore, αV is a stable set for the game
αv.
3. (nucleolus) First note that for any solution x for the game v and any
S ⊆ N ,
αev(S,x) = α(v(S)− x(S)) = eαv(S, αx).
Hence, for any solution y for the game αv, eαv(αx) is lexicographically
smaller than eαv(y) if and only if ev(x) is lexicographically smaller than
ev(α−1y). Since x is the nucleolus of v, αx is the nucleolus of αv.
4. (c-index) Note that for any S ⊆ N − {i} (including S = ∅):
(αv)(S ∪ {i})− (αv)(S) = α(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)).
Therefore, from (4) we get that ci(αv) = αci(v). From here we get that
x is the c-index for v (i.e., if and only if αx is the c-index for αv (i.e.,
x = c(αv)[c(αv)](N)).
Proof of Corollary 6.
Note that D might be a singleton or even the empty set. We need to show
that P[v]⇔ P[αv] for any α > 0. This is a direct consequence of Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 8.
By Remark 7 we only need to show that for every game v such that v(N) = 1
and every x > 0 such that x(N) = 1, there exist β1 and β2 such that
(Φ1(v))(N)x ∈ C(Φ1(v)) and (Φ2(v))(N)x 6∈ C(Φ2(v))
where Φ1(t) := t + β1 and Φ2(t) := t + β2 (both Φ1 and Φ2 are admissible
transformations). Note that
(Φi(v))(N)x(S) ≥ (Φi(v))(S) (5)
is equivalent to
(1 + βi)x(S) ≥ v(S) + βi,
and this is equivalent to
x(S)− v(S) ≥ βi(1− x(S)) (6)
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Note that for any nonempty S 6= N , (1 − x(S)) > 0 (because x > 0 and





implies (5) for any S 6= N, ∅. Hence, (Φ1(v))(N)x ∈ C(Φ1(v)). On the other





implies (5) is violated not only for one but for any S 6= N, ∅. Hence,
(Φ2(v))(N)x 6∈ C(Φ2(v)).
Proof of Corollary 9.
This follows directly from Theorem 8. Note that it is meaningless to conclude
that x > 0, x(N) = 1, belongs to the normalization of the core. Moreover,
by the proof of Theorem 8, any such x is in the core of Φ1(v) and it is not in
the core of Φ2(v) for some admissible transformations Φ1 and Φ2. If P[v] were
a meaningful statement, then the statement “x ∈ D” would be meaningful
for any such x.
The same result holds for stable sets since the core is contained in any
stable set.
Proof of Corollary 10.
The proof is almost the same as the proof of Theorem 8. Again, by Remark 7
we may assume that v(N) = 1. We will consider admissible transformations
Φ of the form Φβ(t) = t + β. Then Φ(v)(N)x ∈M(Φ(v)) if and only if
(1 + β)xi ≥ v({i}) + β, i = 1, . . . , n
and this is equivalent to
xi − v({i}) ≥ β(1− xi), i = 1, . . . , n (7)
Since x > 0 and x(N) = 1, we have (1−xi) > 0, and (7) can be rewritten as
xi − vi
1− xi
≥ β, i = 1, . . . , n.






Therefore, there exists a small enough β such that (7) is violated (i.e.,
(Φβ(v))(N)x 6∈ M(Φβ(v))) and large enough β > 0 such that (7) holds
(i.e., (Φβ(v))(N)x ∈ M(Φβ(v))). Hence, P[v] is a meaningless statement.
Proof of Corollary 11.
This is similar to the proof of Theorem 8. We will show that if P[v] is true
(that is, v(N)x ∈ C(v)), then P[v] is meaningless. The proof is similar to the
proof Theorem 8. We may again assume that v(N) = 1 (Remark 7). Also
note that x(N) = 1 since v(N)x ∈ C(v) (i.e., v(N)x must be a solution).
We only need to find β2 from the proof of Theorem 8 (β1 := 0 works because
v(N)x ∈ C(v) by assumption).
Let nonempty S ⊆ N be such that x(S) 6= 1 (such S exists; for example,
for at least one i: xi 6= 1). For that S, we can find β2 such that
x(S)− v(S) < β2(1− x(S)). (8)
(Note that (8) is the negation of (6).) Obviously, (8) is equivalent to
(1 + β2)x(S) < v(S) + β2
(which is the negation of (5)). Hence, for Φ2(t) = t + β2 we have
(Φ2(v)(N))x(S) = (1 + β2)x(S) < v(S) + β2 = Φ2(v(S))
and we conclude that x is not in the normalization of C(Φ2(v)). Therefore,
P[v] is a meaningless statement since P[v] is true and P[Φ2(v)] is false.
Proof of Theorem 13.
Suppose that P[v] is true. We will show that P[v] is meaningless. Let α =
1
v(N) > 0 and let Φα(t) = αt. Note that Φα is an admissible transformation of
game values of v. Let w = Φα(v). If P[w] is false, then P[v] is meaningless.
Hence, we may assume that P[w] is true (i.e., x ∈ C(w); note that the
normalization of C(w) is C(w) itself since w(N) = 1). Therefore, we have
x(N) = 1 (since x is a solution for w) and xi ≥ w({i}) > 0 for every i ∈ [n]
(this is because x ∈ M(w) and because w({i}) ≥ wmin = αvmin > 0). Pick
any {i} ⊂ N . Note that 0 < xi < 1 (because x(N) = 1 and because xi > 0
for every i ∈ [n]). Let β > 0 be such that
xi − w({i}) < β(1− xi).
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Let Φβ(t) = t + β. Now we have
(Φβ(w)(N))xi = (1 + β)xi < w({i}) + β = (Φβ(w))({i})
and we conclude that P[Φβ(w)] is false (i.e., x is not in the normalization of
C(Φβ(w))).
Finally, note that Φβ(w) = (Φβ ◦Φα)(v) and Φ(t) := Φβ ◦Φα(t) = αt+ β
is an admissible transformation of game values of v since β > 0. Hence, since
P[v] is true and P[Φ(w)] is false, P[v] is meaningless.
Proof of Corollary 14.
The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 13. Suppose that v(N)x is in
some stable set of v. Then v(N)x ∈ M(v). Note that in the proof of The-
orem 13 we have actually shown that if v(N)x ∈ M(v), then (Φ(v)(N))x 6∈
M(Φ(v)). Hence, x cannot be in the normalization of any stable set of Φ(v).
Therefore, if P[v] is true, then P[Φ(v)] is false, i.e., P[v] is meaningless.
Proof of Proposition 15.
Let π be a permutation of [n] and let π(x) be a vector defined by π(x)i :=
xπ−1(i), for all i ∈ [n]. Then, since v is symmetric, v(N)x is the nucleolus of
v if and only if v(N)π(x) is. But the nucleolus is a single point, hence we
must have x = π(x) for any π, i.e., x = 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1).
Note that for any symmetric c value
ci(π(v)) = cπ(v)(v), i = 1, . . . , n.
(This follows directly from (4).) By symmetry, π(v) = v for any permutation
π, so we get that v(N)x is the symmetric c-value if and only if v(N)π(x) is.
Therefore, we again get x = π(x) for any π, i.e., x = 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1).
Proof of Corollary 16.
For any injective Φ, Φ(v) is symmetric because (Φ(v))(S) = Φ(f(|S|)).
Therefore, by Proposition 15, 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1) is the normalization of the nucle-
olus and any symmetric c-value of Φ(v).
Proof of Lemma 17.
By hypothesis, for any M > 0 there exists β > M such that y is the nor-
malization of the nucleolus of Φ(v). Then without loss of generality we may
assume M > n(vmax − vmin)− 1). Therefore, for any β > M ,
1
n
(β + 1) > vmax − vmin
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holds. Let x := 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1). Then x(S) = |S|/n for any S ⊆ N . Let
S, T ⊆ N such that 0 < |S| < |T | < n. Then






> vmax − vmin
≥ v(T )− v(S),
which is equivalent to
v(S)− (β + 1)x(S) > v(T )− (β + 1)x(T ).
From here we conclude
(Φ(v))(S)− (Φ(v))(N)x(S) = β + v(S)− (1 + β)x(S)
> β + v(T )− (1 + β)x(T )







which shows that a nontrivial coalition with maximal dissatisfaction is a
singleton. Let {i0} be a coalition where such a maximum is attained.
Now suppose that y 6= x and that (Φ(v)(N))y is the nucleolus of Φ(v).
Then, from the the definition of the nucleolus (Φ(v)(N))y :
max
S 6=∅,N








In particular for any singleton {i}, (9) implies





which is equivalent to




Since (10) must hold for arbitrary large β > 0, we conclude that yi ≥ 1/n
for all i = 1, . . . , n. This immediately implies y = x (since y(N) = 1), a
contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 18.
Suppose that P[v] is true. We will show that P[v] is meaningless. As in the
proof of Theorem 13, we consider the game w = αv where α = 1
v(N) (note
that Φα(t) = αt is an admissible transformation; also note that w(N) = 1).
If P[w] is false, then P[v] is meaningless.
Hence, we may assume that P[w] is true, i.e., we may assume that y is
the normalization of the nucleolus of w. Let Φβ(t) = t + β. If P[Φβ(w)] is
true for arbitrary large β > 0, then y = 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1) by Lemma 17. This
contradicts the hypothesis y 6= 1
n
(1, 1, . . . , 1) and we conclude that P[Φβ(w)]
is false for some β. Note that, for any β > 0, Φ(t) := (Φβ ◦Φα)(t) = αt+β is
an admissible transformation of game values of v and Φ(v) = Φβ(w). Hence,
P[v] is meaningless.
Proof of Theorem 19.
Let Φ(t) = αt + β, α > 0. For any S 6= ∅ we have (Φ(v))(S) = αv(S) + β.
Let wβ be a symmetric game defined by wβ(S) = β for all S 6= ∅. Then
Φ(v) = αv + wβ
and we have
c(Φ(v)) = c(αv) + c(wβ).
(This follows directly from (4).) Note that c(wβ) = β(c(∅, 1), . . . , c(∅, n)).
Also note that c(αv) = αc(v) (follows directly from (4)) Hence,
c(Φ(v)) = αc(v) + β(c(∅, 1), . . . , c(∅, n)) (11)
First suppose that P[v] is a true meaningful statement. Hence, for any
α > 0 and any β ≥ 0 (since Φ(t) = αt + β is an admissible transformation
for (positive) interval scales), we have that c(Φ(v)) is a scalar multiple of y.
Since P[v] is true, y is a scalar multiple of c(v), so we conclude that c(Φ(v))
is a scalar multiple of c(v). From (11) we conclude that c(Φ(v)) is a scalar
multiple of c(v) for any choice of α > 0, β ≥ 0 if and only if one of the
following holds:
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(a) (c(∅, 1), . . . , c(∅, n)) = 0.
(b) c(v) 6= 0 is a scalar multiple of (c(∅, 1), . . . , c(∅, n)). In this case, the
normalization of y is the normalization of (c(∅, 1), . . . , c(∅, n))
(Note that c(v) 6= 0 by hypothesis.)
Conversely, suppose that either 1. or 2. hold. First suppose that 1. holds.
Then there exists λ ∈ R, λ 6= 0, such that c(v) = λ(c(∅, 1), . . . , c(∅, n))
(this is because P[v] is true). From (11) we conclude that, c(Φ(v)) =
µ(c(∅, 1), . . . , c(∅, n)) where µ = αλ + β. Hence, 1[c(Φ(v)](N)c(Φ(v)) = y
(because y is the unique scalar multiple of (c(∅, 1), . . . , c(∅, n)) such that
y(N) = 1), i.e., P[Φ(v)] is true for any admissible transformation Φ. In
other words, P[v] is meaningful.
Finally, suppose that 2. holds. Then, by (11), c(Φ(v)) = αc(v) and
([c(Φ(v))](N))y = α([c(v)](N))y = αc(v) = c(Φ(v)).
(Note that the second equality holds because P[v] is true.) Hence, P[v] is a
meaningful true statement since P[Φ(v)] is true for any admissible transfor-
mation Φ.
Proof of Proposition 20.
We first show (i). We will show that there are uncountably many interval
scale games v for which v({1}) = 0, v({2}) = 1 and v({1, 2}) 6= 0, 1. Note
that for two such games u ∼ v ⇔ u = v because the only Φ(t) = αt + β
such that Φ(0) = 0 and Φ(1) = 1 is the identity, i.e., Φ(t) = t. Therefore, (i)
holds since v({1, 2}) can be any real number different from zero and one.
Obviously, if there is no Φα,β(t) = αt + β such that u = Φα,β(v), then
there is no Φα(t) = αt such that u = Φα(v). Hence, (i)⇒(r).
It remains to show (o). Let Φv be any increasing function such that
Φv(v(S)) = k if and only if v(S) is the k-th smallest value among {v(S) :
S ⊆ [n], S 6= ∅}. Note that the game Φv(v) is integer valued and the set of
all game values of Φv(v) is the set [k] = {1, . . . , k} where k is the cardinality
(the number of different elements) of {v(S) : S ⊆ [n], S 6= ∅}. (Φv gives
a ranking to all game values of v: for all coalitions S with the smallest
value, [Φv(v)](S) = 1, for all coalitions T with the second smallest value,
[Φv(v)](T ) = 2, . . . ). Note that for an ordinal scale game v, v ∼ Φv(v),
so u ∼ v ⇔ Φu(u) ∼ Φv(v). Also note that Φu(u) ∼ Φv(v) ⇔ Φu(u) =
Φv(v). Hence, the number of ordinal scale games is equal to the number of
different games w such that {v(S) : S ⊆ [n], S 6= ∅} = {1, . . . k} for some
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positive integer k. Clearly such games are in one to one correspondence with
preferential assignments of 2n − 1 objects (nonempty subsets of N in our
case).
Proof of Theorem 22.
Since there are finitely many ordinal scale games ((o) of Proposition 20)
and the set f(R2n−1) is infinite (f is non-degenerate), there exists an ordinal
scale game v and an admissible transformation Φ such that f(v) 6= f(Φ(v)).
Hence, for any x ∈ T either “x = f(v)” is false or “x = f(Φ(v))” is false and
we conclude that P[v] =”x = f(v)” cannot be a meaningful true statement.
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